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Victim and Transgressor Perspectives 2 
When interpersonal transgressions occur, the involved parties try to understand what 
occurred and how justice should be restored. However, research has documented that victims and 
transgressors often diverge in their accounts of what transpired. In this paper, I review and 
summarize empirical research on victims’ and transgressors’ asymmetric perceptions of 
interpersonal transgressions, and the different justice-restoring responses each party subsequently 
desires. By conceptualizing transgressions in terms of the social roles of victim and transgressor, 
I contend that justice responses can be thought of as attempts to correct inequitable distributions 
of material and symbolic resources. This social exchange perspective enables us to understand 
each parties’ motives and how various justice responses might satisfy them. I argue that because 
of these asymmetric perspectives, reconciliation is difficult and conflict is liable to be 
perpetuated rather than resolved.  
 
 
Keywords: interpersonal transgressions, victims, social exchange, perspective taking, guilt, 
blame, apologies, forgiveness, punishment, compensation  
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Asymmetries Between Victims’ and Transgressors’ Perspectives  
Following Interpersonal Transgressions 
 
Whether a broken promise, a hurtful comment, or even something as harsh as physical 
assault, interpersonal transgressions are unfortunately common occurrences in everyday life (e.g. 
Cortina et al., 2001; Nansel et al., 2001). In the wake of these situations, victims and 
transgressors try to make sense of what occurred and decide how the situation should be 
addressed. However, these two parties often disagree about what happened and how best to 
respond. The involved parties sometimes disagree not only about the magnitude of harm but also 
whether the event that occurred even constitutes a wrongdoing. They may also disagree about 
whether justice-restoring responses are appropriate or warranted, such as whether an apology is 
deserved. What gives rise to victims’ and transgressors’ divergent perceptions of interpersonal 
transgressions, and to the differences in justice-restoring responses they subsequently desire?  
In this paper, I review the ways in which victims and transgressors differ in their 
perceptions of transgressions and subsequent desires for justice. I offer a conceptualization of 
interpersonal transgressions in terms of these two social roles (Section 1), and review the 
literature showing they are susceptible to different views of the transgression (Section 2), and 
therefore tend to have distinct emotional reactions (Section 3). I further contend that various 
responses aimed at correcting this injustice can be categorized in terms of whose needs they are 
meant to address (serving victims’ or perpetrators’ interests) but that these two parties diverge in 
their beliefs about how best to restore justice (Section 4). As a result, reconciliation is difficult at 
best, and conflict is liable to be perpetuated rather than resolved (Section 5). Finally, I argue that 
the study of divergent perspectives is an area that is ripe for future research (Section 6), and 
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ultimately, by understanding these asymmetries and each party’s interests, we can obtain a better 
sense of how justice can be restored. 
1. Interpersonal Transgressions and Social Exchange 
Transgressions entail the perceived violation of laws, rules, social norms, or expectations 
regarding others’ behavior (Vidmar & Miller, 1980). Although I confine this review to perceived 
wrongdoing between only two identifiable people within specific social roles - the accused 
transgressor and purported victim - transgressions also occur between groups (e.g. Wohl & 
Branscombe, 2005; 2008) or involve parties who are difficult to identify (e.g. victimless crimes: 
Schur & Bedau, 1974; unidentifiable perpetrators: Small & Loewenstein, 2005). 
Interpersonal transgressions occur in a wide variety of relationships, for example between 
employees in a workplace (Aquino & Thau, 2009), friends at school (MacEvoy & Asher, 2012), 
or partners in a romantic relationship (Luchies et al., 2013). When asked to recall experiences of 
everyday injustice, people most frequently recount experiences of disrespect (Miller, 2001). 
Indeed, in one study, college students most commonly mentioned unjustified accusations or 
blame, lack of recognition for effort or performance, and violations of promises or agreements 
(Mikula, 1986; Miller, 2001). In another study, 71% of public-sector employees reported having 
experienced incivility at work (Cortina, Magley, Williams, & Langhout, 2001), defined as rude 
and discourteous behavior that displays a lack of regard for others (Andersson & Pearson, 1999).  
These and other instances of interpersonal transgressions can be conceived of as 
inequitable social exchanges (Adams, 1965) in which transgressors appropriate resources from 
victims without their permission. According to Blau (1964), social exchange is the fundamental 
structure of interpersonal interactions (see also Homans, 1950; 1958) and concerns the process 
by which people transact with one another and cooperate to achieve better outcomes than they 
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could individually, thus yielding interdependence. In many social transactions, individuals aspire 
to achieve a balance of resources in their favor, although doing so comes at a cost to the other 
party. Thus, inequitable social exchanges yield unfair distributions of resources between two 
social roles: victim and transgressor (Exline et al., 2004; Kelln & Ellard, 1999; Miller, 2001; 
Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). The resources at stake are not only material or financial assets, but 
also symbolic social or psychological resources, such as respect (Miller, 2001) or status within a 
group (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008). For example, a racist remark poorly disguised as a joke can 
make victims feel devalued and excluded (Rattan & Dweck, 2010; Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, 
& Hill, 2006; Sue et al., 2007). Social exchange theory also yields a better understanding of an 
implicit motivation behind transgressors’ intentions: by taking material or symbolic resources for 
themselves, they have appropriated power from victims (Blau, 1964). 
From social exchange theory and research on the psychological strength of social roles 
(Flynn, 2011), we can begin to understand how these two roles make sense of what occurred, and 
why parties disagree about what transpired and how best to respond. In prosocial exchanges (e.g. 
gift giving or favor-doing), givers and receivers differ in their perceptions of the interaction, the 
value of the exchange, and the involved parties’ expectations, and prosocial exchange 
researchers have studied why people with good intentions often mispredict their beneficiaries’ 
reactions (Flynn & Adams, 2009; Flynn & Lake, 2008). Such asymmetries are particularly 
surprising given that people have frequent experience in both roles and often switch between 
them — the information and knowledge incurred from one role does not seem to easily translate 
to the other. By extending this work into the domain of antisocial exchanges, in keeping with 
traditional work on this perspective (Blau, 1964, Homans, 1950; 1958), a social exchange 
perspective contributes a better understanding of why reconciliation is difficult, and of how 
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interpersonal conflicts escalate: if these parties disagree about what occurred, the victim-
transgressor relationship gives rise to attributions that detract from rather than contribute to 
resolution.  
As a result of this conceptualization, two significant theoretical arguments can be made. 
First, justice restoration can be understood as a means of correcting imbalances in symbolic or 
material resources. Some responses such as punishment and compensation can be contrasted in 
terms of their victim- versus transgressor-focused approaches to rectifying inequitable 
distributions (Adams & Mullen, 2013; 2015). Other responses such as forgiveness demonstrate 
victims’ motivation to repair the relationship and promote within-group cooperation, thus 
benefitting both the victim and the group and showing a willingness to forego short term gains to 
rectify the balance in the long-term (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Karremans 
& Van Lange, 2004). Ultimately, then, under this exchange lens, interpersonal transgressions and 
justice restoration are about how effectively inequitable social exchanges can be corrected 
through the redistribution of symbolic and material resources or the foregoing of short-term 
resource in the service of long-term interests. Thus, this perspective provides a framework for 
which responses are effective depending on whose interests they serve.  
The second contribution of a social exchange perspective on interpersonal transgressions 
is a better understanding of why victims and transgressors sometimes disagree about what 
occurred and how resolution can be achieved. In short, the social exchange perspective enables 
us to understand why the process of reconciliation is so fraught. Although sometimes both 
transgressors and victims agree there has been a violation, many inequitable exchanges yield 
perceptions of wrongdoing by only one party. For example, one researcher’s failure to include a 
colleague as a co-author on a paper might only be perceived as wrong by the colleague who felt 
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slighted. For perceptions of wrongdoing to occur, victims and transgressors need not agree that 
resources were distributed inequitably or that an act was harmful: the cascade of judgments about 
intent and blame typically depend on only one party’s belief that a wrongdoing has actually 
occurred. Similarly, beliefs that an inequitable exchange requires a response are often held only 
by the person who perceives there has been a transgression (more often, the victim). Regardless 
of who believes there has been a violation, the interdependence inherent to many relationships 
means that victims and transgressors cannot walk away from the conflict, but must find ways to 
resolve it. 
From the social exchange perspective, interpersonal transgressions yield two different 
roles: victim versus transgressor. In the next 3 sections, I argue that these roles are associated 
with unique psychological interpretations of the transgression, and therefore yield different 
emotional reactions and needs for justice restoration.  
 
2. Asymmetric Perceptions of the Transgression 
According to a growing body of research (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; 
Leunissen, De Cremer, Reinders Folmer, & Van Dijke, 2013), the very roles that arise from 
transgressions yield different beliefs about the violation itself. Victims and transgressors 
sometimes do not even agree that a transgression occurred, and if they do, they may disagree 
about whether the transgressor intended it, how blameworthy the transgressor is, and how serious 
it was.  
Intent, Responsibility, and Blameworthiness 
When wrongdoing occurs, victims try to understand why they were victimized (intent), 
who is responsible, and whether the person is morally culpable (blameworthy). Although these 
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are not the only judgments victims make, they are some of the most common attributions and 
certainly the most often-discussed in the literature on moral judgment (e.g. Fincham & Jaspers, 
1980; Karlovac & Darley, 1988; McGraw, 1987). However, these attributions are prone to bias 
depending on perspective: in a series of studies that asked people to either imagine transgressions 
or recall transgressions they had actually committed, victims thought perpetrators intended to 
cause more harm than perpetrators reported having actually intended (Adams & Inesi, 2016). 
People may be especially prone to this error when transgressions are unintentional: when 
transgressors clearly decide to cause harm, victims have more complete information about the 
transgressors’ actions and mindset (see Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007).  
Judgments of transgressors’ intent are also related to attributions of blameworthiness: at 
least from a third-party perspective, the more transgressors are perceived to have intended harm, 
the more they are blamed and judged to be responsible (Cushman, 2008; Shaver, 1985; Shlenker 
et al., 1994). In one study on first-person micronarratives about interpersonal conflict, 33% of 
perpetrators indicated they felt the victim shared some part of the blame for the conflict, whereas 
only 4% of victims felt the same way (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). Perpetrators 
characterize the victim as having provoked the incident, compared to victims’ own beliefs 
(Zechmeister & Romero, 2002), and victims see the offending behavior as more immoral than 
transgressors do (Kearns & Fincham, 2005). Even when observers witnessed a transgression and 
thought they might be future transgressors (perpetrator-relevant participants), they minimized the 
responsibility of the original transgressor; victim-relevant participants reported thought they 
thought transgression they witnessed had not occurred by chance (Chaiken & Darley, 1973). In 
sum, victims tend to perceive greater intentionality and blameworthiness than transgressors do, 
and these attributions appear to vary systematically by social role.  
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Transgression Severity 
Victims and transgressors also make judgments about the magnitude of the violation, but 
research has consistently found that transgressors are more likely to downplay the amount of 
harm caused relative to victims. Such systematic discrepancies in estimates of severity have been 
termed ‘magnitude gaps’ (Baumeister, 1997; Baumeister & Campbell, 1999). For example, in the 
study of micronarratives, 16% of perpetrators’ stories included a denial of negative consequences 
of a conflict (no victims made this denial), and negative consequences were more apparent in 
victims’ stories than in perpetrators’ (Baumeister et al., 1990). Similarly, perpetrators are more 
likely than victims to portray their own actions as due to external or mitigating circumstances 
(Kearns & Fincham, 2005; Zechmeister and Romero, 2002).  
Given these asymmetric perceptions of intent, blame, and severity, some conflicts will be 
exacerbated rather than resolved if the two roles cannot reach agreement about the transgression 
itself. These perceptions are likely to yield different reactions to the transgression and beliefs 
about how the conflict should be resolved. Therefore, the focus of the next two sections is on 
understanding how victims and transgressors react to transgressions and what they believe 
should be done to restore justice.  
3. Asymmetric Emotional Reactions to Transgressions 
What are victims’ and transgressors’ emotional responses to transgressions, and how do 
they differ? Scholars have predominantly focused on victims’ reactions of anger and moral 
outrage (e.g. Darley & Pittman, 2003; Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005; Mikula, 1986), 
which are particularly common after violations to personal autonomy (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & 
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Haidt, 1999; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011).
1
 Negative outcomes generate feelings of deservingness 
in victims which in turn have been linked to emotions such as resentment, particularly when the 
conflict is not resolved (Feather, 2006), and victims report experiencing greater anger after 
intentional than unintentional transgressions (Leunissen et al., 2013). However, victims are also 
prone to mispredicting the duration of their anger: victims think they will dislike transgressors 
longer after severe rather than trivial harm, but in reality, dislike lasts longer after minor 
transgressions than major ones since major transgressions trigger psychological defense 
processes (Gilbert, Lieberman, Morewedge, & Wilson, 2004).  
Transgressors’ emotional reactions are more complex. Transgressors sometimes do not 
think victims have the right to be angry. For example, even though victims reported still feeling 
angry after the transgression, perpetrators suppressed or even denied victims’ anger (Baumeister 
et al., 1990). Transgressors also thought victims’ anger was less justified than victims did, even 
when rated by an independent coder (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). However, if 
transgressors accept responsibility for what happened, they are likely to experience guilt or even 
shame (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011). Transgressors are more likely to feel guilty after 
unintentional than intentional transgressions because in the second instance, they mean to cause 
harm and therefore do not feel bad about the outcome (Leunissen et al., 2013). When participants 
were asked to imagine committing a transgression and were induced to believe such actions were 
morally wrong, they subsequently reported feeling greater guilt, a troubled conscience, and 
concern about how others were affected (Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002).  
                                                     
1 Other emotional reactions such as disgust, shame, and embarrassment have received attention 
in the literature (Keltner, 1996; Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, 
& Barlow, 1996). 
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In sum, victims experience anger and although transgressors minimize victims’ anger, 
they also feel guilty. Troublingly, neither party appears to accurately estimate the magnitude of 
these emotional reactions in their counterpart: when victims were asked to predict how much 
transgressors felt guilty about what they had done, they provided lower estimates than 
transgressors did, due to their increased estimates of transgressors’ intentions to cause harm 
(Adams & Inesi, 2016). These asymmetric emotional reactions yield differing beliefs about what 
these parties think should be done to restore justice. Whereas victim anger has been linked to 
increased desires for compensation and retribution (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Miller, 2001), guilt 
has been linked to desires for forgiveness (Riek, 2010) and transgressor self-punishment 
(Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). Therefore, in addition to surveying the literature on emotional 
reactions, I also consider each party’s motives and needs in the wake of transgressions.  
4. Asymmetric Desires for Justice Restoration  
Following the social exchange perspective, the goal of justice restoration is to fully 
restore the system back to its pre-transgression state when taking into account the costliness of 
the transgression. In the event that standard cannot be achieved, attempts to partially resolve the 
inequity may establish a new baseline for the exchange. However, due to the asymmetric 
perceptions of transgressions and emotional reactions reviewed above, victims and transgressors 
diverge in their justice-related goals and motivations (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Drawing on this 
research, reconciliation can be thought of as a social exchange in which each parties’ differing 
needs are addressed through mutual understanding of these divergent goals (Okimoto & Wenzel, 
2008; 2014). Below, I review the various strategies that each role tends to adopt that are meant to 
serve that party’s needs. 
Victims’ Motives 
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Transgressions threaten victims’ power and status as valued members of a group, 
rendering them powerless and lowering their sense of control (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Thus, 
reconciliation is achieved by meeting their desires for empowerment (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). 
Victims can feel empowered when transgressors apologize by acknowledging the harm they have 
caused and promising to make it right (Scher & Darley, 1997); such apologies empower victims 
by acknowledging the event and their right to victim status: “The perpetrators’ acknowledgement 
of their responsibility for causing the injustice… returns control to victims who may determine 
whether to cancel the moral ‘debt’.” (Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009, p. 
1022). Indeed, victims are most likely to want apologies after intentional rather than 
unintentional transgressions due to the anger they experience (Leunissen et al., 2013). However, 
there is also some evidence that victims overestimate the value of apologies: victims who were 
asked to imagine receiving an apology rated its value to be higher than when they actually 
received an apology (DeCremer, Pillutla, & Reinders Folmer, 2011).  
Like apologies, compensation also constitutes a symbolic and material acknowledgement 
of wrongdoing and an attempt to repair it (Darley & Pittman, 2003), thus validating the fact that 
victims have been wronged. Victims’ desires for compensation might be driven by perceptions of 
harm rather than self-interested desires for money. Miller (2001) noted that “the indignation with 
which people respond to unfavorable outcomes (e.g. lower than expected salary offers) often 
reflects the fact that their prestige or status has been threatened more than the fact that their 
purchasing power has been diminished.” In contrast to victim-focused compensation, victim-
enacted punishment is a transgressor-focused strategy can be seen as an attempt to reassert one’s 
status/power (Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008); when victims punish, it is also 
discussed in the literature as revenge (e.g. Carlsmith, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008). In support of the 
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notion that victim punishment of transgressors is empowering, research has shown that victims 
claim they want transgressors to be punished and find revenge satisfying (Gollwitzer & Denzler, 
2009; Strelan & van Prooijen, 2013), and transgressor punishment is linked to victim mood 
improvement (Gollwitzer & Bushman, 2012), particularly when the transgressor understands 
why revenge is being taken (Gollwitzer, Meder, & Schmitt, 2011). Cooperator (victim) 
punishment of defectors (transgressors) in social dilemmas also promotes cooperation and 
fairness norms in future exchanges (Fehr & Gachter, 2002), thus making victims feel that the 
chance of a future violation is decreased. However, contrary to what victims might predict, 
revenge can yield increased rumination and negative affect instead of improving mood and 
bringing a sense of closure (Carlsmith, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008), unless transgressors 
acknowledge the victim’s intentions in punishing (Funk et al., 2014). This therefore underscores 
the notion that victims value punishment based on its ability to motivate long-term cooperative 
exchange norms.  
Finally and somewhat counterintuitively, victims can be empowered by forgoing 
punishment and releasing anger and instead choosing to forgive transgressors. Raj and 
Wiltermuth (2016, this issue) argue that victims experience substantial psychological barriers to 
forgiveness, and that they will be wary of forgiving if it makes them feel weak or appearing to 
condone the wrongdoing, again indicating that empowerment is an important concern for 
victims. However, their empirical work demonstrated that victimized participants who forgave 
their transgressor were more likely to experience a heightened sense of power over their 
transgressor than those who did not forgive (Raj & Wiltermuth, 2016), thus suggesting that 
victims may not appreciate the extent to which forgiveness empowers them. Therefore, 
forgiveness serves not only to make guilty transgressors feel better, it also re-empowers victims.  
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Taken together, this literature suggests that several responses (apologies, compensation, 
punishment, and forgiveness) might satisfy victims’ need to feel empowered. However, victims 
may also overestimate the extent to which these responses will satisfy them. Furthermore, they 
may also be mistaken in their estimations of transgressors’ willingness to engage in these 
behaviors and transgressors may not always understand victims’ desires for these behaviors, a 
point which can be better understood by turning to transgressors’ perspectives on these 
responses. 
Transgressors’ Motives 
In contrast to victims, transgressors are primarily concerned with their appearance as 
moral and their likelihood being socially excluded from a group following transgressions due to 
their perceived lack of integrity (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Therefore, perpetrators are most 
likely to reconcile with victims when they feel they are re-accepted as moral people. Perpetrators 
adopt strategies to restore their public image such as apologizing (Ten Brinke & Adams, 2015), 
offering compensation (Adams & Mullen, 2013), and even self-punishing (Nelissen & 
Zeelenberg, 2009). In one study on micro-narrative accounts of transgressions, perpetrators 
indicated that they regretted the incident and referenced making an apology (Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990).  In another study, transgressors reported that they did not intend to 
cause harm and that they did feel guilty and wanted forgiveness (Adams & Inesi, 2016). Such 
behaviors satisfy a transgressor’s goals of alleviating guilt and of reacquiring a moral image 
because they enable the transgressor to present and view him/herself as appropriately remorseful 
and motivated to make things right. However, victims underestimate how guilty transgressors 
feel and their subsequent desires for forgiveness, despite transgressors reporting feeling guilty 
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and wanting to be forgiven (Adams & Inesi, 2016; see also Baumeister et al., 1990), thus 
suggesting that victims tend not to appreciate transgressors’ guilty feelings and repair strategies. 
Problematically, however, a transgressor’s desire for a positive identity and image can 
also lead him or her to minimize or downplay responsibility for the magnitude of the harm. In 
that same micronarrative study by Baumeister and colleagues, perpetrators were also more likely 
than victims to report having been provoked, deny that their transgressions had negative 
consequences, and were less likely to believe that they had damaged the relationship 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). By minimizing their blameworthiness and the 
magnitude of the wrongdoing, transgressors can still psychologically maintain a moral self-
concept and present a public image of integrity. 
Ultimately, after interpersonal transgressions, victims and transgressors enact behavior 
that will best meet their individual needs. This unilateral approach that each side adopts means 
that the other parties’ needs are not necessarily well-served. Because conflict resolution is best 
achieved when both parties’ needs are met, it is also important to understand how well each 
strategy meets the other role’s goals (e.g. how well victims’ strategies meet perpetrators’ goals). 
In the service of the empowerment and reacceptance motives, whereas transgressors 
minimize the emotional and physical damage that has occurred, victims tend to emphasize the 
amount of harm (Baumeister et al., 1990). This results in a magnitude gap (Exline & Baumeister, 
2000), which means that many conflicts remain unaddressed when apologies or compensation 
could help (Tabak et al., 2012). This magnitude gap creates barriers to reconciliation as 
transgressors fail to repair transgressions in ways that are consistent with what victims want (see 
Table 1). For example, even though victims want apologies after intentional transgressions, 
perpetrators are actually more likely to apologize after unintentional rather than intentional 
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transgressions due to the guilt that they feel (Leunissen et al., 2013). Transgressors also 
overestimate how aversive it would be to apologize (Leunissen et al., 2014), suggesting that 
transgressors are reticent to apologize and even when they do, it is not necessarily when victims 
want it. Finally, victims underestimate transgressors’ desires for forgiveness, and because 
victims’ beliefs that transgressors want to be forgiven correlates with their actual propensity to 
forgive, such miscalibrations have important implications for eventual conflict resolution 
(Adams & Inesi, 2016).  
Taken together, the literature suggests that victims and transgressors have different needs 
in the wake of transgressions, and that each party’s strategies serve their own needs while often 
failing to address their counterpart’s. Ultimately, if each party considers his or her own needs at 
the expense of the other, this makes it less likely that resolution will be achieved. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------------------- 
 
5. Explanations, Implications, and Remedies 
Certainly, victims’ and transgressors’ divergent perspectives on transgressions can occur 
because of self-serving biases. For example, victims may be more motivated than transgressors 
to claim that a transgression is harmful because of the compensatory payout they stand to gain. 
Although each party’s desired responses often align with self-interest, such explanations do not 
fully predict how each party actually behaves. For example, victims sometimes do not want 
apologies (Leunissen et al., 2013) and perpetrators do self-punish (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 
2009). Moreover, self-serving biases are less likely to occur in romantic relationships where both 
parties are satisfied with the quality of the relationship because in these cases, partners highly 
Victim and Transgressor Perspectives 17 
satisfied with their relationships interpret transgressions in more benevolent ways (Kearns & 
Fincham, 2005).  
Victims’ attributions of intent and blameworthiness may also be due to actor-observer 
asymmetries in which victims fail to take into account the extent to which transgressors’ actions 
are externally influenced, opting instead to ascribe them to transgressors’ choice (Jones & 
Nisbett, 1971, but see Malle, 2006). Therefore, victims infer that transgressors’ actions are 
voluntary and freely chosen, whereas transgressors can call to mind external factors and 
mitigating circumstances that influenced their actions (Ross, 1977). Indeed, the actor-observer 
asymmetry is more likely to emerge in the context of negative interactions (Malle, 2006) when 
actors’ intentions are not transparent to observers, as is often the case in interpersonal 
transgressions. Even then, the actor-observer asymmetry does not fully explain some of the 
biases discussed above, such as why perpetrators underestimate how much victims want to be 
forgiven. The asymmetries reviewed here show that transgressions create strong social roles that 
yield unique, divergent beliefs about how best to respond; these beliefs stem from the self-
protective motivation to view one’s own transgressing actions as justified and legitimate.   
Ultimately, this research contributes to a better understanding of why conflict is 
exacerbated and why relationships are sometimes destroyed rather than repaired: asymmetric 
perceptions preclude the ability to come to a mutual understanding of what occurred and how 
best to respond. If, for example, victims underestimate how much transgressors want to be 
forgiven, as in the case of one RAF pilot who withheld forgiveness from his German attackers 
for many years (Tate, 2010), it means that many relationships remain needlessly unrepaired 
(Adams & Inesi, 2016). However, if victims offer forgiveness when transgressors do not want to 
hear it, this would be particularly problematic for relationship repair. When victims expressed 
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forgiveness but transgressors felt they had not done anything wrong, transgressors viewed these 
victims as more morally self-righteous and wanted to avoid these people more (Adams, Zou, 
Inesi, & Pillutla, 2015). This means that under certain circumstances, reconciliation strategies 
yield the opposite response: instead of repairing relationships, they are further damaged.  
One potential solution to these asymmetries could be increased perspective-taking by 
both parties. Prompting each party to think about past experiences in the other role or even to 
adopt the perspective of their counterpart could aid reconciliation. Indeed, restorative justice 
conferencing allows people to reduce the gap in perspectives and can create a shared 
understanding between victims and transgressors (Wenzel et al., 2008). This was the inspiration 
for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission created in the aftermath of apartheid in South 
Africa (Okimoto, Wenzel, & Platow, 2010). However, after transgressions occur, transgressors 
are relatively more powerful than victims (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008), and powerful people are 
less likely to perspective-take (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006). Therefore, people 
must be motivated to think about their counterpart’s perspective. Even then, perspective-taking 
may not resolve these asymmetries (Stillwell & Baumeister, 1997). Although perspective-taking 
can help victims understand that transgressors do want to be forgiven (Adams & Inesi, 2016), 
such attempts will not succeed if each party cannot shake off their own biases to adopt the other 
party’s perspective. Indeed, particularly in competitive contexts, taking the perspective of a 
counterpart could create self-protective motives (Pierce et al., 2013). Future research could 
explore the conditions under which perspective-taking occurs and helps resolve conflict. 
Another insight and potential intervention comes from research that tests the Valuable 
Relationships Hypothesis. People are motivated to reconcile and return to positive interaction if 
they believe that their relationship possesses long-term value (McCullough, 2008; McCullough 
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et al., 2010) and forgiveness is more likely when participants are committed to making a 
relationship succeed (Finkel et al., 2002). However, if victims and transgressors differ in how 
much they value the relationship, this could create obstacles to reconciliation. Since part of the 
battle of reconciliation is motivating participants to want to resolve their differences, getting 
them to see the long-term value of their relationships may be one way to foster perspective-
taking and ultimately, resolution. 
 
6. Future Directions 
 Acknowledging victims’ and transgressors’ divergent perspectives is key to 
understanding and addressing interpersonal conflict. However, the empirical work on differences 
in this area stands to benefit from some additional considerations that are enumerated below. 
Other Roles and Perspectives 
Research on decision-making biases has been applied to understanding the psychology of 
social justice (Carlsmith, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008; Gilbert et al., 2004), highlighting a number of 
forecasting errors that both victims and transgressors makes. This work on asymmetries could be 
applied to understand when, for example, victims and transgressors are differently prone to 
forecasting errors; for example, victims might mispredict the value of forgiveness to 
transgressors. Moreover, although I have compared victim and transgressor perspectives, there is 
extensive literature on the perspectives of third-party observers (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; 
Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003) and even observer perceptions of third-party responders 
(Adams & Mullen, 2013) that could yield insight into which perspectives are likely to be biased.  
Finally, there is substantial research on intergroup transgressions (e.g. Wohl et al., 2015, 
see also work on collective guilt (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004), and future research could 
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examine how individual-level asymmetric attributions contribute to group-level asymmetries and 
intergroup conflict and vice versa. The difficulties of understanding each party’s perspective 
become even more complicated when multiple victims and/or transgressors are involved, and 
when transgressions are ongoing and long-term. Some asymmetries might hold when comparing 
victimized and transgressing groups, thus revealing why so many intergroup conflicts seem 
intractable. However, others have noted that the same processes that govern interpersonal 
interactions may not hold for intergroup relations (Insko et al., 2005); for example, apologies 
from individuals have been linked to increased forgiveness, but this effect does not hold for 
group apologies (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). 
Although sometimes it is clear who has transgressed against whom, this distinction is not 
always so clear. For instance, perpetrators sometimes believe victims share part of the blame for 
transgressions (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). Moreover, in one-shot transgressions, 
each person occupies one role, but in many real-world conflicts, each person causes harm to the 
other over time so that the line between these roles becomes blurred and people become both 
victims and transgressors (SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2013). How, then, do victims’ and 
transgressors’ attributions change in these more dynamic and complex interactions in which the 
categorical lines are blurred and mutual influence is possible? One possibility is that after 
repeated transgressions, revenge against an original transgressor may be perceived as that 
transgressor’s victimization, thus giving rise to the subsequent cascade of attributional 
asymmetries as the conflict cycle begins anew. Moreover, as both parties come to see themselves 
as victims, reconciliation may become less likely as arguments develop over who has suffered 
more. Thus, one intriguing implication is that asymmetries in initial conflicts engender long-term 
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conflict. As a result, questions about why victims and perpetrators disagree about what occurred 
might better be characterized as why victims and perpetrators ever reach agreement.  
 
Interdependence Among Responses 
Although this paper has focused on asymmetries between victims’ and transgressors’ 
responses to injustice, there is a burgeoning body of work on the interdependence of these 
responses. In the real world, many responses occur in tandem with one another, and some studies 
have looked at the interplay between these responses. For example, from both the perspective of 
actual responders and third-party observers, punishment decrease desires for compensation 
because people’s sense of justice is restored, but compensation does not decrease desires to 
punish (Adams & Mullen, 2015). Furthermore, when the perpetrator transgresses by making 
their counterpart incur a loss, compensation repairs trust more effectively than an apology, 
whereas when the perpetrator unfairly gains at the expense of another, apologies are more 
effective than compensation (DeCremer, 2010). Similarly, victims’ reactions to transgressions 
influence transgressors’ decisions to apologize and offer compensation (Desmet & Leunissen, 
2014; Leunissen, De Cremer, & Reinders Folmer, 2012), and apologies in turn influence victim 
forgiveness (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010). In other words, these responses tend not to occur in 
isolation of other responses. Thus, even as the lines between these two social roles tend to be 
blurred over time, their reactions to one another become non-independent.  
Furthermore, responses to injustice ultimately depend not just on perspective, but also on 
any prior or co-occurring justice responses (e.g. apologies before or alongside compensation). 
One particularly interesting area for future research pertains to how these two roles think about 
multiple responses and the interplay between them. How do victims versus transgressors think 
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about the relationship between, for example, apologies and forgiveness, punishment and 
compensation, or other responses that often co-occur? One possibility is that victims feel 
obligated to forgive after an apology, whereas transgressors view their apologies as gifts and 
think victims are not obligated to forgive. Furthermore, victims might desire compensation even 
when the perpetrator has been punished, whereas transgressors might believe punishment has 
been enough and that they are not obliged to further compensate the victim. Understanding and 
assessing the success of any response must therefore be made with an awareness of the role and 
the context, including previous or co-occurring responses. 
Conclusion 
Research on perceptions of, emotional reactions to, and responses to interpersonal 
transgressions benefits from understanding both victims’ and transgressors’ perspectives. It is 
clear that the involved parties do not always agree about what transpired, nor do they react to 
transgressions in similar ways. Each party has different needs in the wake of wrongdoing, and 
their perspective about what will restore justice tends not to be calibrated to the other party’s 
expectations. Therefore, conflict resolution is best achieved when these two roles understand one 
another’s perspectives.  
Beliefs about what responses will restore justice should be grounded in a better 
understanding of the potential asymmetries between these two parties. From a theoretical 
perspective, approaches to justice research benefit from a comprehensive understanding of both 
parties’ views. From a practical perspective, repair and reconciliation can only begin once 
victims and transgressors recognize that there are liable to be differences in their perspectives. 
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Table 1 
 
Victims’ and Transgressors’ Perceptions of and Responses to Interpersonal Transgressions  
 
 
 
 
                       
          Transgression Role  
  
    
Victim 
 
 
Transgressor 
 
 
 
 
Perceptions of 
Transgression 
  
Transgressor’s 
Intent to Harm 
 
 
Transgressor 
intended to harm 
 
Lower intent to harm 
 Transgressor 
Responsibility 
 
Transgressor was 
responsible, is 
blameworthy 
Tend to account for  
external, mitigating 
circumstances 
 
 Transgression 
Severity 
 
More severe Less severe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Responses to 
Transgression 
 
 
Emotional 
Reactions 
 
Anger, Moral 
Outrage 
 
 
 
Feels angry 
 
Thinks victim’s 
anger is not justified 
Guilt Thinks transgressor 
does not feel guilty 
Feels guilty (when 
transgression was 
intended) 
 
  
Apology 
 
 
 
Wants apology when 
transgression is 
intentional  
 
Apologizes when 
unintentional 
 
Actions 
Taken 
Compensation Greater desire for 
compensation  
Less inclined to 
compensate 
 
 
Punishment Greater desire for 
revenge, to see 
transgressor punished 
 
Do not want victim 
to take revenge, do 
not want punishment 
 Forgiveness Underestimates 
transgressor’s desire 
for forgiveness 
Wants to be forgiven 
 
